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Cherokee Nation Election of 1995
Ahnawake Carroll1

INTRODUCTION

“[I]t is clear that the Framers of the 1975 Constitution intended,
as did the Tribal Council, to set up a functioning Judicial branch
of government, separate and distinct from the Legislative (Tribal
Council) and Executive (Chief and Deputy Chief) branches of the
government.”2
The 1995 Cherokee Nation tribal election precipitated a test of the
constitutional distribution of powers within the Cherokee government. As a result,
the tripartite Cherokee government resolved the constitutional test by relying on the
judiciary to adjudicate various controversies arising out of the election.
Specifically, the Cherokee judiciary was called upon to interpret both the Cherokee
Constitution as well as codified Cherokee law regarding election issues affecting
the entire Cherokee Nation for the next four years. The immediate effect was the
Cherokee judiciary actively exercising its constitutionally delegated authority to
rule on cases falling within its jurisdiction. The broader effect of this exercise of
judicial power, however, served as an aggressive check on the legislative and
executive powers of the Cherokee government for the first time in Cherokee
history.
Separation of powers is one of the basic principles of American
constitutionalism. 3 Although the “Constitution created separate executive,
legislative, and judicial departments, it established no air tight
compartmentalization of the branches.”4 As a result, the constitutional principle of
checks and balances was established to “ensure the political independence of each
branch and to prevent the accumulation of power in a single
department.”5 Although these concepts of American constitutional law are found in
form within the Cherokee Nation, tension often exists between these principles in
the context of tribal application.
This paper will discuss the role of the Cherokee judiciary in the greater
scheme of this distribution of power between the branches of Cherokee
government. In addition, the role of the Cherokee judiciary will be considered in
regard to judicial checks upon abuses of power by the legislative and executive
branches of government. The mechanism through which this analysis will be
filtered is the 1995 Cherokee tribal election. Using five selected rulings arising
from the 1995 election, this paper will discuss ways in which certain judicial
rulings served as an assertive check upon the independent powers of the Cherokee
legislative and executive branches pursuant to the notion of governmental checks
1
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Letter from Dwight Birdwell, Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal Chief Justice, to Joe Byrd,
Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation (Sept. 5, 1995) in GREGORY UPTON, A HISTORY OF THE
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and balances. In addition, the rulings will illustrate ways in which the judiciary
either affirmatively exercised and firmly established its own separate power to
interpret the Cherokee Constitution and the Cherokee Code, or acknowledged the
independent powers of the other two branches of government to act in certain
circumstances pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine. In addition, discussion
will focus upon the perceptions and responses by the executive and legislative
branches of Cherokee government to each successive judicial ruling, as well as the
perceptions and responses of the Cherokee community at large.
To set the judicial rulings in proper context, this paper will offer a brief
history of the Cherokee judiciary, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal, as well as the
Cherokee Nation election process. The next section of the paper explains why the
1995 election was particularly significant. Finally, the paper will provide an
overview of each judicial ruling; explore the perceptions and responses to the
ruling; and analyze the importance of each case to the separation of powers, or
checks and balances doctrines. Each case analysis will also consider factors that
may have influenced the court’s rationale, or have persuaded the court to rule a
certain way in a particular case.
I. History of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
A full understanding of the status and workings of the modern day
Cherokee judiciary is impossible without some background regarding the
development of the Cherokee Nation judicial system. The traditional territory of the
Cherokee Nation originally encompassed the southeastern portion of the United
States.6 The Cherokee people originally had no written laws in the manner of the
United States at large, but rather relied upon mutual submission to customary
procedures as defined by clan membership.7 In fact, during the eighteenth century,
the Cherokee people at large had no centralized political system, police system, or
formal court system.8
Although the traditional law governing the Cherokee tribe was well
established and well adhered to by its members, external influences upon Cherokee
life commenced as early as 1690.9 Perhaps the greatest transforming factor upon
Cherokee jurisprudence was the need to centralize the political power of the tribe in
an effort to deal with external mechanisms such as encroachment on Cherokee
land, intermarriage with non-Cherokees, and significant declines in Cherokee
populations due to disease and warfare.10 To that end, the Cherokee at different
times adopted written constitutions and legal codes, a formal court, a general
6

TILLER’S GUIDE TO INDIAN COUNTRY 502 (Veronica E. Velarde Tiller ed., 1996)
[hereinafter TILLER’S].
7
JOHN PHILLIP REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: THE PRIMITIVE LAW OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION 231 (1970).
8
WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 10-11
(1986).
9
Id. at 3.
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council, and an internal policing system.11 Although the Cherokee adopted many
aspects of a western legal system, it should be noted that the important functions of
the “clan relationships and responsibilities” were retained, albeit in a role
secondary to that of the centralized government.12 Thus, the Cherokee Nation was
deeply entrenched in a modified system that included centralized government and
formal codification of laws.
During the period 1838-1839, despite Cherokee protests in federal court,
the Cherokee people were displaced to Indian Territory in what is now the state of
Oklahoma.13 Unfortunately, “[f]rom the end of the 19th Century until 1907, the
Oklahoma Territory was being prepared for statehood.”14 Thus, despite the fact that
“[b]y the time of Oklahoma statehood the Five Civilized Tribes had been operating
their constitutional republics for more than three-quarters of a century,”15 the grant
of statehood in 1907 imparted a complete shutdown of the formal Cherokee
government.16 This termination of the Cherokee government effectively lasted for
sixty-eight years.
In 1975, however, the Cherokee Nation began to reorganize itself pursuant
to the federal Indian policy of self-determination.17 The Cherokee Nation adopted
its own governing Constitution in 1975 after a draft was submitted to the Cherokee
populace for approval. 18 One specific area the Cherokee tribe targeted for
revitalization was its judiciary.19 In fact, according to one noted scholar, “[t]he
most important Indian event since statehood [was] the rebirth of Indian tribal courts
in Oklahoma.”20
The 1975 Constitution adopted by the Cherokee people superceded the
1839 Constitution and specifically provided for the existence of a judicial branch of
government.21 Article VII of the Constitution states:
11

See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 45, 287; See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE
SPIRITS 56, 58, 64, 65 (1975).
12
McLOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 226.
13
TILLER’S, supra note 5, at 502.
14
Justice Philip H. Viles, Jr., Keynote Address at the Second Annual Native American Symposium at
the University of Arkansas (Nov. 1995), in HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL APPEALS
TRIBUNAL, supra note 1, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
15
RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA 51 (1980).
16
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles. See also Chadwick Smith & Stephanie Birdwell,
Cherokee Courts: A Historical and Modern Perspective 17 (1993) (on file with author) (specifically,
“[t]he Cherokee people were bureaucratically prevented from electing their own Principal Chief and
legislature” while “[s]chools and services previously controlled by the Cherokee Nation were
administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs” as a result of the Dawes Commission, the Oklahoma
Enabling Act of 1907, and fluctuating federal Indian policies).
17
See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 224-233 (4th ed. 1998).
18
GREGORY UPTON, A History of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal (Supreme Court) of the Cherokee
Nation 1990-1996, in HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 1, at 2.
19
CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA art. VII.
20
STRICKLAND, supra note 14, at 76.
21
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There is hereby created a Judicial Appeals Tribunal composed
of three (3) members all of whom must be admitted to practice
law before the highest Court of the State of which they are
residents, and all of whom shall be members of the Cherokee
Nation, appointed by the Principal Chief and approved by the
Council for such terms as the Council may provide. The
purpose of this Tribunal shall be to hear and resolve any
disagreements arising under any provisions of this Constitution
or any enactment of the Council. The Council shall provide for
a procedure which shall insure that any litigant receives due
process of law together with prompt and speedy relief… The
decision of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal shall be final insofar
as the judicial process of the Cherokee Nation is concerned.22
The judicial branch of the Cherokee government was constitutionally
mandated to exist as a “separate and distinct” branch of Cherokee
government. 23 Article IV of the Constitution specifically directly addresses
distribution of powers within the Cherokee Nation.24 The language states that
the powers of the government of the Cherokee Nation shall be
divided into three (3) separate departments: the Legislative,
executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this
Constitution, the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
departments of government shall be separate and distinct and
neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of
the others.25
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cherokee Constitution delegated to the
judicial branch the power to hear and resolve disagreements arising under any
constitutional provision or any legislative enactment, the modern day embodiment
of the Cherokee judiciary proved to be a relatively quiet entity in its formative
years. Even as the Court matured, the most modern history of the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal was a relatively peaceful time.26 In fact, “[w]ith the exception of the
annual judicial conferences, appearances before the Tribal Council, ceremonial
functions and the presentations of annual reports, little else occurred.”27 Although
the Tribunal caseload would increase slightly in the years after 1992, the subject
matter of litigation was limited mostly to isolated incidents involving tribal
employment issues, and one child custody dispute.28
In 1995, however, things changed when the Court heard over twenty
cases.29 This increased tender of cases before the Tribunal was partly due to the
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id. at art. IV.
Id.
Id.
UPTON, supra note 17, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 11.
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fact that 1995 was a tribal election year.30 In fact, one-fourth of all actions filed for
adjudication before the Tribunal in 1995 were “election controversies.”31
In 1995, the Tribunal was composed of Chief Justice Dwight Birdwell,
Justice Ralph Keen, and Justice Philip Viles. As this paper will demonstrate, these
“three justices of the Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal were called upon
by the Cherokee government and people more than ever in 1995, to make important
decisions that effected [sic] the future of the Cherokee Nation.”32
II. History of Cherokee Nation Election Process
The importance of the 1995 election to the Cherokee people, as well as to
the increased utilization of the Cherokee Tribunal, can only be understood in the
historical context of the Cherokee election process. When the Cherokee tribe
historically moved to a more centralized form of government, the necessary
outcome was recognition of “a strong principal chief with veto power over Council
actions.”33 Accordingly, “[s]ome of the power formerly centered in the Council”
was now held by the Principal Chief.34 This centralized governmental structure
continued well into the post-removal era as evidenced by the fact that “[e]lections
for Principal Chief and for other offices were held at regular intervals from 1839
until Oklahoma’s statehood in 1907, just as regular elections had been held for
many, many years in the ancestral lands of the Cherokees.”35
As noted earlier, however, the advent of statehood eradicated all forms of
Cherokee self- government derived from an election process by the general
Cherokee populous.36 Although the Cherokee government did continue to exist, it
was “on a very limited, appointed type basis.”37 In fact, from statehood through
1975 “the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation was appointed by the President
of the United States on an ‘as-needed’ basis. These appointments in the early years
were for one day at a time, when the Chief would sign documents, purporting to be
acting as head of the Cherokee Nation.”38 In 1941, however, the President of the
United States, Franklin Roosevelt, changed course of action and appointed a
Cherokee Principal Chief to serve for an entire year, although without the support
of a Deputy Chief or legislative body.39 J.B. Milam served in this capacity as
appointed Principal Chief until his death in 1949, whereupon United States
30
31
32

Id.
Id.

Cherokee tribunal called upon to make important decisions
ADVOCATE, Jan. 1996.
33
PERSICO, supra note 9, at 101.
34
Id.
35
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
36
Id. at 2.
37
Birdwell, supra note 1, at app. at Letters and Related Documents.
38
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
39
Id. See also Smith & Birdwell, supra note 15, at 19.
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President Harry Truman named his successor W.W. Keeler. 40 Principal Chief
Keeler held office as a presidential appointee until 1971.41 In 1971, however, the
Cherokee people held “the first election for Chief since statehood.”42 As a result
Keeler “became the first chief elected by all of the Cherokee people since 1903.”43
At the end of Keeler’s term in 1975, another tribal election narrowly
named Ross Swimmer as the new Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation.44 At this
point, however, the Cherokee Nation was still a “one-person
government.”45 Consequently, Principal Chief Swimmer quickly moved
for the adoption of a new constitution because the election for
principal chief had been so close and contentious. It was his
hope that the constitution would have a unifying effect. It
would also show [the Cherokee] people that he did not intend to
usurp the government, but rather to lead as an executive with
the power of the tribe divided among three separate entities.46
Overall, this new “constitution promised ‘speedy and certain remedy’ to
all Cherokees who suffered wrong and injury. It also established a check-andbalance system within [the] tribal government, and allowed for all registered
Cherokees to vote in tribal elections.”47 Although the adopted constitution failed to
unite the tribe as hoped48, it did result in the immediate election for a Deputy Chief
and a fifteen member tribal council.49
The aspect of the Cherokee Constitution that is most relevant to our
discussion here, however, is the section providing “a basic framework for holding
elections.” 50 The constitutional mandate is that “the Council shall enact an
appropriate law not inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution that will
govern the conduct of all elections.”51 In addition, the Constitution states specific
qualifications for a Tribal Council candidate to be a “member by blood of the
Cherokee Nation,” and to have attained “at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
that date of the election.”52 In addition, “no person who shall have been convicted
of or has pled guilty or has pled no defense to a felony charge under the laws of the
40

Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles. See also STANLEY W. HOIG, THE
CHEROKEE AND THEIR CHIEFS 262 (1998).
41
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
42
Id.
43
WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER
PEOPLE 217 (1993).
44
Id. at 218.
45
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
46
MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 42, at 218.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
50
Id.
51
CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA art. IX, § 1.
52
Id. § 2.

8/15/18 2:00 AM

7

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 3

United States of America, or of any State, Territory, or Possession thereof, shall be
eligible to hold any office or appointment of honor, profit or trust within this
Nation unless such person has received a pardon.” 53 The Constitution further
dictates that a person cannot simultaneously hold “any office of honor, profit or
trust” in another tribe and in the Cherokee Nation without prior Council
approval.54 Finally, the Constitution declares that “all elections shall be determined
by secret balloting.”55
Additionally, the Cherokee Tribal Council has promulgated enactments
per its constitutional authority over the years that serve to regulate the election
process. These enactments “served for the elections of 1979, 1983, 1987 and
1991.” 56 The legislative enactments were eventually codified for the express
“purpose of conducting all Cherokee tribal elections, e.g., Principal Chief, Deputy
Principal Chief, Council and Constitutional amendments and referenda of the
Cherokee Nation.”57 Specifically, Title 26 of the Cherokee Nation Code regulates
such election issues as: the tenure of elected officials; representation by district;
voting by district; tribal election supervisory bodies; qualifications and registration
of voters; qualifications of and filing by candidates; and conduct of elections.58
One specific election entity created by Cherokee legislation meriting
mention is the Tribal Election Commission. The Tribal Election Commission is
composed of five (5) members, two (2) appointed by the
Council, two (2) appointed by the Chief and one (1) by those
four (4), who shall have the sole responsibility and explicit
authority for the conduction of all elections conducted by the
Cherokee Nation, and shall serve for a period from the day of
appointment until (6) months following the general election or
as extended by the council.59
More specifically, “[i]t is the responsibility of this Commission to carry
out the election laws as passed by the Council, supervise the declarations of
candidacy, arrange the printing of the ballots and perform the background checks
of the candidates as required by the election rules.”60 Furthermore, the “Tribal
Election Commission shall be empowered to develop rules and regulations
necessary to conduct tribal elections.”61 It should be noted that group members are
unpaid and have “periodic meetings before the election and then intensive meetings
during the actual election and counting of votes.”62
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
26 CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANNOTATED § 1 (1993) [hereinafter CNCA].
See 26 CNCA (Supp. 1994).
26 CNCA § 11(A) (1993).
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
26 CNCA § 11(F) (1993).
Viles, supra note 13, at app. at Newspaper Articles.
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Nevertheless, in spite of the passage of legislative enactments aimed at
facilitating tribal elections and the use of the Tribal Election Commission, all
elections subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution in 1975 gave rise to
litigation with the exception of the 1991 election.63 The nature of the Cherokee
elections is best illustrated by a former Principal Chief who stated that “because
[the] tribe is so large, running for tribal office is much like running for Congress, or
even a national political post. It is very much a mainstream process, complete with
print and broadcast advertising, campaign billboards, rallies, and all that sort of
thing.”64 Perhaps as a result, election controversies continue to emerge despite
efforts at comprehensive constitutional and codified election law.
II. History of Cherokee Nation Election Process
The next step in this analysis requires examining the significance of the
1995 election and why this particular election garnered more attention and resulted
in more legal disputes than previous election cycles. This issue can best be
addressed by a quick explanation of the historical events leading up to the 1995
election.
As stated previously, Ross Swimmer was elected Principal Chief in 1975.
Chief Swimmer won another term in 1979 and sought reelection for his third fouryear term in 1983.65 Swimmer chose Wilma Mankiller as his running mate, and the
Swimmer-Mankiller ticket won the 1983 election.66 In 1985, however, Swimmer
resigned his post as Cherokee Principal Chief “to head the BIA [after] he was
nominated by President Ronald Reagan to serve as [A]ssistant [S]ecretary of the
[I]nterior for Indian [A]ffairs.” [ 67 ] Mankiller finished out the remainder of
Swimmer’s term pursuant to a constitutional mandate that the deputy chief
automatically replace a resigning chief who leaves prior the expiration of his or her
term of office.68 Mankiller subsequently ran for the office of Principal Chief and
won on her own accord in 1987.69 Notably, this was first time that the Cherokee
Nation had elected a woman as Principal Chief.70 Chief Mankiller then won a
second term in 1991 with “no election disputes and no recounts because of Chief
Mankiller’s great margin of victory,” a lack of opposition for the office of Deputy
Chief, and the fact that the “Tribal Council members were finally elected by
district, rather than at large.71
The 1991 tribal election created a wake of tranquility in the Cherokee
Nation. The executive branch had the overwhelming support of the Cherokee
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 42, at 240.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 249.
MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 42, at 249.
Viles, supra note 13, at Newspaper Articles.
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people as evidenced by it winning 82.7 percent of all votes in the
election.72 Additionally, the judiciary caseload was minimal.73 In fact, the 1991
inaugural speech of Chief Mankiller opined that
[a]s we approach the twenty-first century, the Cherokee Nation
still has a strong, viable tribal government. Not only do we
have a government that has continued to exist, we have a tribal
government that’s growing and progressing and getting
stronger. We’ve managed not to just barely hang on, we’ve
managed to move forward in a very strong, very affirmative
way.74
Unfortunately, this era would prove to be the calm before the storm. In
1995, Mankiller chose not to seek reelection for Principal Chief, and the ensuing
election became extremely contentious. There were many variables that made the
1995 election significant. This was only the fourth election for Principal Chief
since 1975.75 In addition, a new Principal Chief and Deputy Principal Chief would
be chosen by the Cherokee people from a field of candidates that, for the first time
since 1975, did not include an incumbent, but rather a diverse mixture of nine
candidates.76
Perhaps the most viable candidate for election was George Bearpaw, a
former director of tribal services staunchly supported by the incumbent Mankiller,
who would presumably maintain the status quo of the tribe.77 The other feasible
candidate was Joe Byrd, a former eight- year member of the tribal council, who if
elected would become the first bilingual, full-blood Principal Chief of the Cherokee
Nation in modern history. 78 Byrd based his platform on representing “the
grassroots,” and saw the lack of incumbents on the ticket as providing the Cherokee
people with “new hope for a fresh beginning” because “a lot of Cherokees [wanted]
to see a change of focus.”79 The diverging viewpoints of the leading candidates
were of significant consequence to the election. In fact, Chief Mankiller was quoted
as saying, “There’s a lot of anxiety at the Cherokee Nation. Someone could come
up with a new perspective and rechange the focus, and people are concerned about
that. It’s not going to be traumatic, just a little stressful.”80 The stakes were also
considered high regarding the election of the Principal Chief because this person
would lead the second largest tribe in the United States to the cusp of the twenty-

72
73
74
75
76
77

MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 42, at 255.
UPTON, supra note 17, at 1.
MANKILLER & WALLIS, supra note 42, at 255.
Manny Gamallo, Cherokee Chief Sworn In, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 15, 1995.
Donna Hales, Cherokees to select new leaders Saturday, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, June 16, 1995.

Donna Hales, Chief hopeful admits felony, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX AND TIMESDEMOCRAT, July 17, 1995.
78
Gamallo, supra note 74.
79
Hales, supra note 75.
80
Id.
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first century, in addition to heading “the oversight of a $150 million annual
budget.”81
As the 1995 election season progressed, however, the election became
significant for a much different reason. Upon the emergence of various firstimpression election issues, disputing parties sought resolution through the internal
judicial process of the Cherokee Nation. Although the judiciary had been called on
to resolve other election disputes, this particular election resulted in a series of
judicial decisions that served as an assertion by the judiciary of its authority to
interpret constitutional and legislative provisions regarding election law, as well as
its authority to affirmatively check the power of the other governmental branches.
These rulings caused increased attention to be focused on the role of the judiciary
and its place within the Cherokee government because of the far-reaching impact
these particular election decisions would have upon the Cherokee government and
people. These rulings of the Court would serve as an impetus for one newspaper to
declare the election as “one of the most bitter and controversial election cycles in
modern times,” producing “a general atmosphere of chaos, with no one appearing
too sure about who was responsible for what.”82
IV. Case Discussions
The election controversies started almost immediately at the beginning of
1995. In February of that year, approximately four months prior to the scheduled
tribal election, the Tribunal heard its first case. In Leach v. Tribal Election
Commission of the Cherokee Nation83, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
codified Cherokee law establishing a residency requirement for otherwise
constitutionally qualified Principal Chief and Deputy Principal Chief candidates.84
The Cherokee Constitution requires the Principal and Deputy Principal
Chief to be citizens of the Cherokee Nation; to have been born within the
boundaries of the United States, its territories or possessions; to have reached the
age of thirty at the time of the election; and to be a member by blood of the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.85 In addition, the Cherokee legislature enacted a
residency requirement that all “qualified candidates for the offices of Principal
Chief and Deputy Principal Chief shall have established a bona fide permanent
residence within any one of the 9 districts… for no less than 182 days immediately
preceding the beginning filing date of that particular election year.”86
In this case, the plaintiff Leach was a resident of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, and a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, who expressed interest in running
81
82

Id.

Court reform is least of tribe’s woes, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX AND TIMESDEMOCRAT, Oct. 24, 1995.
83
Leach v. Tribal Election Comm’n of the Cherokee Nation, 4 Okla. Trib. 225 (Cherokee
Nation J.A.T. No. 94-01 July 24, 1995).
84
Id. at 227.
85
Id. at 228.
86
26 CNCA § 37(B) (1993).
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for either the office of Principal Chief or Deputy Principal Chief.87 Leach alleged
that although he was eligible to run for those offices under the Cherokee
Constitution, the enacted residency requirement deprived him of the right to
run.88 Leach argued that the Constitution “established the requirements for the
office of Principal Chief or Deputy Chief, and as such, the challenged legislation
added an additional requirement above and beyond those set forth in the Cherokee
Constitution.” 89 Leach’s attorney further explained during hearing that “such a
residency requirement would create a discriminatory hardship upon candidates
living outside the jurisdiction that would not be encountered by those candidates
who already live within the tribe’s jurisdictional boundaries.”90
After establishing the judicial branch’s jurisdiction to hear the case under
Article VII of the Cherokee Constitution 91 , the Court held that the residency
requirement found in the Cherokee code regarding “candidates for the offices of
Principal Chief and Deputy Principal Chief, [was] in violation of the Constitution
of the Cherokee Nation and as such [was] void and unenforceable.”92
The Tribunal addressed two issues in its reasoning. First, although the
Court interpreted the constitutional grant of power to the Tribal Council as a broad
power “…to establish laws which it shall deem necessary and proper for the good
of the Nation”93 this grant of legislative power was necessarily limited by the
language in the Constitution restricting the Tribal Council from passing laws
contrary to the Constitution.94
Second, the Court looked at whether the residency requirement enacted by
the tribal legislature contravened the Constitution.95 Here the Court concluded that
“[b]y ratifying the Constitution, the people of the Cherokee Nation declared that if
a person meets these qualifications, that person is eligible to be Principal Chief or
Deputy Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation. The people established no
residency requirement for these offices.”96 Consequently, the legislative acts that
established “requirements over and above those in the Constitution are ‘contrary’ to

87
88
89
90
91

Leach, 4 Okla. Trib. at 227.
Id.
UPTON, supra note 17, at 12.
Ruling could affect leadership of tribe, CHEROKEE ADVOCATE, March 1995.

Leach, 4 Okla. Trib. at 227 (Constitution Art. VII “provides that the Tribunal shall have original
jurisdiction to hear and resolve any disagreements arising under provisions of the Constitution, or any
enactments of the Council.”). E-mail from Stacy Leeds, Associate Justice, Cherokee Nation Judicial
Appeals Tribunal, to author (April 17, 2003, 09:19 MST) (on file with author) (noting, however, that
original jurisdiction would not exist with the Tribunal in a situation where the Constitution stated that
the Council shall enact laws to govern the conduct of elections, and in those enacted laws the Council
created a subordinate commission with jurisdiction to hear election issues, then the Tribunal would not
have original jurisdiction).
92
Id. at 228.
93
Id. at 230.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 228.
96
Id.
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the Constitution, and as such, are unconstitutional.”97 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court rejected an argument that the enacted law was constitutional because of
its sole application to candidates for those offices.98 The Court reasoned that the
“requirements for the office and for candidacy do not differ”99 because the only
means of becoming Principal or Deputy Chief was to go through the election
process.100 Therefore, it was “unrealistic to require more restrictive qualifications
on a candidate than upon a holder of that office. Given the election procedure, the
only difference between ‘a candidate for Principal Chief’ and the ‘Principal Chief’
is that the latter was a successful candidate.”101
Despite the holding, the Court itself was not taking a position as to the
desirability of a residency requirement.102 The Court stated that “[i]f the Cherokee
people desire to have a residency requirement for the Principal Chief and Deputy
Principal Chief, then the people must vote to change the Constitution.”103
The reception to this judicial opinion was relatively quiet. The only
comment by the Cherokee legislative branch was via a tribal attorney stating “the
defendants [were] disappointed but respectful of the Tribunal’s
decision…”104 Although the overall response was relatively quiet, the Cherokee
tribal newspaper viewed the ruling of the court as one that “could dramatically
affect the leadership of the Cherokee Nation.”105 On the whole, however, it seems
that this first ruling by the Tribunal received little fanfare from the Cherokee
people or from the other branches of Cherokee government.
In this first election case, the Tribunal took a simple, pragmatic approach
to solving the residency requirement controversy before it. Not only did the Court
opt to strictly uphold the authority of the Constitution as the “fundamental law” of
the
Cherokee
Nation
[106], but the language of the opinion also reflected a strict adherence by the
Tribunal to its singular role as the final arbiter of disagreements involving either
the Cherokee Constitution or enacted Cherokee law. The court explicitly stated at
the end of the opinion that despite holding that the residency requirement for
Principal Chief violated the Constitution, the court was not taking a position as “to
whether or not a residency requirement [was] desirable. There are those who
believe such a requirement is desirable, and those who believe it is not
desirable.” 107 The Tribunal clearly refused to go beyond its constitutionally
97
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mandated role and refused to engage in dicta or policy recommendations in the
opinion.
Another interesting aspect of the opinion was the great emphasis placed
by the Court upon the intent and will of the Cherokee people. For example, in the
Court’s holding that the enacted residency requirement was contrary to the
Constitution, the Court specifically mentioned that “[b]y ratifying the Constitution,
the people of the Cherokee Nation declared” the qualifications for election
candidates.108 In addition, the Court stated at the end of the opinion that it is up to
the Cherokee people, not the Tribal Council, to amend the Constitution if “the
people” want to have a residency requirement.109
The context in which this opinion was delivered may provide some insight
into the various emphases of the Court. One factor may be the nature of the
controversy itself. The Court was required to rule upon an election issue with
potentially far reaching implications as to the future leadership of the entire tribe.
Perhaps this is one reason that the Court considers so strongly the intent of the
Cherokee people in their constitutional ratification of the candidacy requirements
of potential future Cherokee leaders. Another factor may be the very nascent nature
of the Court itself. The Court was just coming out of a very tranquil and judicially
inactive period when it was faced with this very complex issue involving election
procedure and exercises of governmental power. Thus, it could be argued that in an
effort to establish itself as a viable and legitimate branch of Cherokee government,
the Court is cautiously exercising its judicial power when called upon to rule on
cases of far-reaching impact, as well as cases that involve action by another branch
of government. By strictly adhering to its constitutionally mandated role and
placing great reliance upon the will of the Cherokee people as manifested in the
Constitution, the Court is perhaps taking the sting out of the assertive check it
placed upon the Tribal Council’s abuse of legislative power of enacting laws
contrary to the Constitution.
It seems, however, that Court may also have had an unspoken line of
reasoning for its ruling. According to a speech by one of the sitting Justices made
subsequent to the election the Court considered in its decision that there were
“nearly 140,000 Tribal members scattered in all 50 states and many foreign
countries who had vested interest in running for office and, indeed, in voting for
someone from their respective geographic area.” 110 In addition, the Court
considered the historical dispersal of Cherokee citizens, as well as the potential
contemporary need to seek employment and education outside of the historic
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.111 Thus, although the Court took a strictly
interpretive approach when authoring its opinion, there seem to be normative ideas
of fairness, as well as tribal historical considerations, underlying the reasoning. It is
unclear why these considerations by the Court were not mentioned in the opinion
itself. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the Court wanted to present a direct and
uncomplicated opinion that focused upon a constitutional basis for its ruling in an
108
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effort to validate itself as a separate, distinct branch of government carrying out its
duty of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Or the exclusion may simply be
a function of the calm tribal political climate at the time the opinion was rendered
which made additional justification for the court holding unnecessary in the view of
the Court.
Overall, this case provided an opportunity for the Court to assertively
exercise its separate and distinct constitutional power to interpret the Constitution
and enacted law, while simultaneously placing a check upon the power of the
legislative branch of Cherokee government in response to its enactment of laws
violating the Constitution.
There was no other judicial involvement in the election until after the June
19, 1995 primary. The primary election outcome resulted in two front-runners;
Bearpaw led after receiving thirty-nine percent of the vote while Byrd followed
after receiving approximately twenty-nine percent of the vote.112 As a result of no
candidate receiving a majority of the votes as stipulated by Cherokee codified law,
a run-off election was required.113 Before the run-off election could take place,
however, the Tribunal was called upon to make some of the most controversial
decisions in its short existence.
The second case before the Tribunal stemmed directly from the primary
election. In Pritchett v. Cherokee Nation114, the Tribunal encountered an issue that
directly affected every tribal member seeking to vote in a Cherokee tribal election.
The plaintiffs in this case attempted to vote in the primary election by presenting
Tribal Membership Cards at the polling place, but were summarily denied because
they were not also registered to vote in a particular district as required by the Tribal
Election Commission.115 Although the presentation of a Tribal Membership Card
allowed a cardholder to vote in tribal elections in the early days when Cherokee
Nation elections used an “at large” voting process, this was no longer considered a
viable method because of a change to Tribal Council members being elected from
districts pursuant to a 1987 Constitutional amendment revoking at-large
elections.116 Thus, “in order to make sure that constituents voted only for the proper
candidates, voters who lived within the Cherokee Nation were placed in districts
according to their residence” when they registered to vote.117
The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit claiming that “the Election
Commission rule that required all voters to be registered was implemented without
112
113
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authority, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.” 118 The remedy sought by the
plaintiffs included invalidation of the primary election, as well as the granting of a
new election in which tribal members could validly use their Tribal Membership
cards to vote without additional registration.119 The plaintiffs claimed that it “was
impossible to determine the outcome of the primary election because the number of
Cherokees that were denied the opportunity to vote was so vast. Therefore, the
election results could not stand.” 120 The plaintiffs fostered their argument by
focusing upon the “hardships that such a registration required,” and several times
raised the “specter of an all-day visit to the Election Commission by an elderly
Cherokee, in order to properly register.”121
After establishing jurisdiction122 and before certifying a class, the Court
addressed the preliminary question of whether “the Election Commission’s
requirement that voters must be registered by districts [was] a valid exercise of
power.”123 The Court held that the Cherokee Constitution “grants broad general
powers to the Tribal Council to establish laws which the Council shall deem
necessary for the good of the Nation.” 124 The Court reasoned that the 1987
Constitutional amendment requiring “Council Members to be elected from districts
instead of at-large, necessarily included the authority for the Tribal Council to
enact laws requiring registration by the voters.”125 Therefore, the Court interpreted
the Constitutional amendment as giving the Tribal Council the power and
discretion “to decide in favor of a registration process, as opposed to districting by
any other method.”126
Thus, the Court found that delegation of power from the Council to the
Tribal Election Commission via a series of legislative enactments “to develop and
implement regulations necessary to require registration of all voters in tribal
elections” was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power of the Tribal
Council127 in light of the fact that the Cherokee Code also “grant[ed] to the Election
Commission the power to develop regulations necessary to conduct
elections.” 128 In addition, there was a legislative requirement that “all tribal
members who reside within the historical boundaries of the Cherokee Nation must
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be registered to vote in the district of their residence.” 129 Thus, subsequent
registration requirements adopted by the Tribal Election Commission “were a
legitimate exercise” of authority.130 All in all, the Court held that “registration and
enrollment of voters was not improper, and there was nothing arbitrary or
capricious about the way in which the Election Commission had done its job.”131
The reception to this ruling garnered little more attention than that of the
previous case. In fact, most of the attention came in the immediate aftermath of the
election, but prior to the judicial ruling. Yet, there were some sentiments expressed
by the community that included the idea that “citizens of the Cherokee Nation
don’t have the rights that citizens of Oklahoma or citizens of America
have…Cherokee citizens do not have access to voting that other people
have.”132 Another newspaper article quoted one candidate as saying “I feel like we
confused the people with the voting process… I feel like we have deprived the
people of the right to vote.” 133 These comments perhaps reflect a sense of
disenfranchisement from the tribal election process after being denied the ability to
vote, which may have then translated into a feeling of disconnection by tribal
members from the Cherokee Nation in general. Another candidate told the Tribal
Election Committee that “[t]his election has lost us the confidence of the Cherokee
people.”134 This feeling seems to be reflective of a sense that the Cherokee voting
process, and thus the Cherokee government, was unduly oppressing its members by
not allowing them to vote in a certain manner, and thus removed the members from
active participation in their own governmental process.
In contrast, the only comment to come from a branch of Cherokee
government was from the Principal Chief stating that “we are looking at what went
wrong so it won’t happen again in future elections… [o]bviously, none of us did
enough to see that people were properly registered.”135 According to the Election
Commission chairman, just prior to the 1995 election there were about 80,000
Cherokee citizens who were of voting age, but there were only 30,004 out of that
number who were registered to vote.136 Interestingly, and perhaps as evidence of
the importance of this particular election to the Cherokee voters, even though these
same registration requirements had been in place during the prior election, no
controversy or comment arose regarding any denial of voting rights.137 Regardless,
there was little other comment either positive or negative on the judicial ruling.
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In this second election case, the Court retained its formal, matter-of-fact
approach when rendering its opinion. Although once again faced with a potentially
far-reaching issue in the form of denial of tribal voter rights, the Court strongly
adhered to a strict judicial interpretation of the Constitution as well as the Court’s
role as constitutional interpreter. In the instant situation, the Court actively
exercised its power to interpret both the Constitution and enacted law in order to
determine whether the legislative branch had validly exercised its power pursuant
to constitutional authority.
The Court again referred to the actions of the Cherokee people by using a
constitutional amendment adopted by the Cherokee voters as supportive of the
decision that the legislature had the power to act. Thus, it seemed that the Court
would continue to be deferential to the voice of the Cherokee people via the
Constitution when there is a constitutional question, even if the result would be
extensive denial of tribal voter rights. Perhaps as further support for ruling on the
authority of another branch of government to act, the Court recounted the positive
legislative history of the laws in question in this case. As a result of its findings and
interpretations, the Court affirmatively recognized the legitimate exercise of power
by the Cherokee legislature to create enactments and to delegate authority to other
entities to carry out those enactments. In addition, because the Court exercised
judicial restraint in this case by allowing the tribal legislature to make enactments
unfettered by a judicial check, the separation of powers doctrine was bolstered
because the legislature was able to exercise its constitutionally delegated power to
enact laws.
Although the Court fails to mention any external influences affecting the
ruling, there is arguably a strong social interest in having a uniform election
process implemented regarding the registration of voters in a tribe as populous as
the Cherokee Nation. The fact that this suit was being brought as a class action
could arguably have had some additional influence on the judicial opinion because
of the potential consequences upon all the eligible voters within the Cherokee
Nation, not just the two plaintiffs filing the complaint.
Perhaps most informative, however, is the remedy sought by the plaintiffs.
The invalidation of an election, as well as the ordering of a new election, would be
an enormous drain on tribal resources. In addition, there is arguably an expectation
on the part of the voter that the election will be conducted in a valid and sustainable
manner that will preserve the voter’s choice in a particular election.
One interesting factor in this case that may or may not have had an impact
on the decision of the Tribunal, but that sheds light on the political situation at this
point in the election is that one of the plaintiff’s attorneys was a defeated candidate
in the primary election. In fact, rumblings of political unrest were beginning to
surface regarding the election at this point, which may be indicative of the political
atmosphere at the time. The lack of general attention paid to the outcome of this
case, however, is probably found in the fact that another judicial opinion issued on
the very same day “would prove to be the most publicized litigation in the
Tribunal’s existence.”138
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The Tribunal was called upon to determine the eligibility of the leading
candidate for Principal Chief. 139 In Mayes v. Cherokee Nation 140 , the Court
consolidated two cases in which both plaintiffs sought to have the primary election
leader Bearpaw stricken from the run-off ballot for the office of Principal
Chief.141 According to the facts of the case, Bearpaw shot another man in the
stomach in 1975.142 Bearpaw was subsequently charged under Oklahoma law in the
District Court of Cherokee County with assault with a dangerous weapon, a
sentence that carried a penalty of imprisonment of not more than ten years in the
state penitentiary, or imprisonment of not more than one year in the county
jail.143 A few months later, however, Bearpaw “entered a plea of guilty, and upon
recommendation of the District Attorney, was placed upon a two year deferred
sentence.”144 Under Oklahoma law this process “allow[ed] expungement of the
record if the defendant follow[ed] the rules and conditions of probation and the
orders of the court for a period of two years. If he [did] not do so, then he [was]
sentenced under the Oklahoma statutes.”145 Bearpaw apparently met the regulations
because he “received an order from the District Court expunging the record in his
case” in 1977.146
According to the plaintiffs, Bearpaw was ineligible to be a candidate or to
hold the office of Principal Chief for two reasons: 1) Bearpaw had committed a
shooting constituting a felony, and 2) Bearpaw had “filed his Declaration of
Candidacy with the Tribal Election Commission” and yet “signed a paper
certifying under oath that he had never pled guilty to any felony charges.”147 Thus,
both sets of plaintiffs felt that Bearpaw should have his name stricken from the runoff ballot.148 One set of plaintiffs in the consolidated case, however, sought to have
the run-off election rescheduled, while the other set of plaintiffs sought to have any
absentee ballots voting for Bearpaw held for naught while still proceeding with the
election.149
The defendants argued, however, that Bearpaw should be allowed to
remain on the ballot as a candidate for Principal Chief, and the run-off election
should proceed as scheduled.150 To that end, the defendants supported their position
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by citing the United States Supreme Court case Kercheval v. United States151, as
well as “numerous state court opinions that follow[ed] Kercheval.” 152 The
proposition emanating from those cases was that “once a defendant is allowed to
withdraw a guilty plea in a criminal action, the guilty plea can never again be used
against him in a subsequent criminal trial.”153
In determining whether Bearpaw was eligible to run for or hold the
Principal Chief position, the Court first established jurisdiction by acknowledging
that these issues arose out of a Constitutional provision, as well as an enactment of
the Tribal Council.154 According to the Cherokee Constitution,
no person who shall have been convicted of or has pled guilty,
or has pled no defense to a felony charge under the laws of the
United States of America, or any State, Territory, or Possession
thereof, shall be eligible to hold any office or appointment of
honor, profit or trust within this Nation unless such person has
received a pardon…155
In addition, the Cherokee Nation Code states:
F. The candidate shall not have been convicted of or have pled guilty or
no defense to a felony under the laws of the United States of America, or of any
federally-recognized Indian tribe, or of any state, territory or possession thereof,
unless such person has received a pardon.
G. The candidate must certify that if elected Principal Chief, said
candidate shall resolve all conflicting interests and that said candidate will
automatically be disqualified in the event false or misleading information or
statements are made in filing for this office.156
Based on interpretation of these provisions, the Court
unanimously held that Bearpaw’s “plea of guilty in the 1975
Cherokee County felony case render[ed] him ineligible to be a
candidate for any office or appointment of honor within the
Cherokee Nation.”157 In addition, the Court held that Bearpaw
violated Cherokee codified law “when he filed his Declaration
of Candidacy with the Tribal Election Commission when he
certified under oath that he had never pled guilty to any felony
charges.”158 The Court based its decision on a “clear reading”
of the Cherokee Constitution and Cherokee Nation Code to
determine that “neither law makes an exception for a deferred
sentence, no matter how the deferred sentence is handled.”159
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The Court further reasoned that the “the Cherokee Nation, as a quasisovereign, ha[d] the authority to determine the qualifications for those who would
hold office within the Nation.”160 The adoption of both the constitutional and code
provisions above indicated to the Court that the Cherokee Nation “wanted only
those with the highest moral character to hold elected office within the
Tribe.”161 The Court stated that the sole issue was whether Bearpaw made an
original guilty plea, and it was inconsequential “how the court in question handled
the guilty plea. The only exception that is allowed by our Constitution is if Mr.
Bearpaw received a pardon, and he has not.”162
After considering many remedies, the Court ultimately ordered the Tribal
Election Commission to either strike Bearpaw’s name from the ballot prior to the
election, or to collect all the ballots cast for Bearpaw without counting them and
“hold them for naught” after the election.163 The Court further ordered the run-off
election to continue as scheduled, “and to declare those with the highest number
votes as a winner, without consideration for the votes cast for Mr. Bearpaw.”164
The Court enumerated various policy reasons for the remedy it granted.
Primarily, the Court considered the “best interest of the Cherokee Nation” and
determined that it was critically important that “the Tribe continue without
interruption following the expiration of the terms of the current Principal Chief and
Deputy Principal Chief.”165 The Court felt that “irreparable harm” would occur if
the run-off election was delayed beyond “the date set by the Constitution for the
swearing-in of new officers.” 166 In addition, the Court rejected scheduling an
entirely new run-off election because it would be “impossible to carry out such a
schedule when absentee ballots must go through the mails to the voters and back to
the Election Commission.” 167 Consequently, the Court held that to allow “the
current run-off to continue without counting the votes cast for Mr. Bearpaw” to be
“in the best interests of the Cherokee Nation.”168
It should be noted that one Justice differed in his determination of what
the remedy should be.169 Justice Viles favored a new general election “with all the
previous candidates for Principal Chief except George Bearpaw (and then a run-off,
if necessary)” because those who voted for Bearpaw in the primary election “ha[d]
been disenfranchised through no fault of their own.”170 The Justice acknowledged,
however, that a new election “would be expensive, time-consuming, and perhaps
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confusing to the voting public,” in addition to the fact that the election could not
take place by the constitutionally mandated date for swearing-in.171 These factors
would cause additional problems “in terms of leadership, authority, succession,
etc.”172
The perception of this issue within the Cherokee Nation seemed to show a
reliance upon the Cherokee Constitution as the final arbiter of the dispute. One
Tribal Council member was quoted before the Court’s decision as saying “if we
can’t follow the Constitution, we might as well throw it out. Sometimes, I think we
already have.” 173 Another candidate commented, “[e]ither we enforce our
constitution or we throw it away.” 174 Finally, the Chairman of the Cherokee
National Party was quoted as saying “[t]he framers of the (Cherokee) constitution
enunciated the sound public policy that felons shall be ineligible to hold office in
the Cherokee Nation.”175 This case also elicited comments regarding the idea of
separation of powers, as evidenced by one newspaper’s statement that the fact
“[t]hat the tribunal eventually interceded in the election process and disqualified a
candidate for chief speaks volumes for the increasing separation of powers between
the executive and judicial branches of the Cherokee Nation.”176
The third case to come before the Tribunal during the 1995 election cycle
was a marked departure by the Court from the strictly practical and interpretive
opinions rendered in the two previous cases. The Court did not completely dispose
of its interpretive approach, however, as evidenced by the Court expressly stating
the basis for its decision as predicated upon a “clear reading” of the Constitution
and the Code.177 The Court again relied upon the voice of the Cherokee people
echoing through the Constitution because, according to one Justice’s statement in a
speech after the election, “the framers of the Constitution and the voters who
approved it had chosen their words carefully and, although there were numerous
opportunities in the succeeding 20 years to change the wording, none of those
opportunities had been seized.”178 Interestingly, the Court failed to mention in its
written opinion this use of the framer’s intent in its interpretation of the
Constitution.
The Court did expressly mention for the first time, however, an
interpretation beyond the plain language of the constitutional provision at issue
when it stated that the Cherokee Nation in “[a]dopting a constitutional provision
that bar[red] convicted felons, and anyone else who has pled guilty or no defense to
a felony in any state, tribal or federal court means that it wanted only those with the
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highest moral character to hold elected office within the Tribe.”179 This reference to
moral character could either suggest a shift from the court’s prior strict adherence
to an interpretive approach in the election opinions toward a more social policy
basis for its holding, or suggest merely a recognition of the value found in the text
of the Constitution.
The Court also departed here from its prior refusal to give any additional
justification for a holding expressly within the language of the opinion. In this case,
the Court enumerated the various policy reasons supporting the Court’s remedy.
The Court seemed to see its role as one of facilitating a smooth and minimally
disruptive effectuation of the tribal election process. The Court thus sought a
smooth transition of the executive officials that would “continue without
interruption”; sought to prevent “irreparable harm to the Tribe” by facilitating a
delay of the run-off election; and, finally, sought to prevent the impossibility of
carrying out a new run-off election because of the time needed to process absentee
ballots.180 One could argue here that the ruling was an effort by the Court to
recognize the power of the legislative branch to enact, without judicial interference,
laws deemed necessary for the good of all the Cherokee people, thereby giving
great deference to the separation of powers between the branches of the Cherokee
government.
Also of interest was the court’s reaction to the use of a United States
Supreme Court case and numerous state opinions as precedent for the defendant’s
position. The Tribunal seemed to take this opportunity to actively assert the
sovereignty of the tribe, as well as the Court. For example, the Court rejected the
use of the federal and state opinions when it stated that “[t]he Cherokee Nation, as
a quasi-sovereign, has the authority to determine the qualifications for those who
would hold office within the Nation.”181 In addition, the Court remarked that the
only exception to Cherokee tribal candidate qualifications was to be found
in our Constitution (emphasis added). 182 The Court clearly asserted the tribe’s
judicial independence from foreign judicial forums. As such, the Court identified a
separation of power, not from other Cherokee branches of government, but from
the potential encroaching influence of both the federal and state courts.
The context in which this decision was made was also of importance. As
this case was decided just six days prior to the run-off election, the Court was under
tremendous time pressure to render a verdict. Thus, the closeness of the run-off
election clearly affected the decision and reasoning of the court regarding its choice
of remedial measures. In fact, the proximity to the run-off election caused the Chief
Justice of the Tribunal to schedule “an unprecedented Sunday session” in order to
adjudicate the case.183
This case was also meaningful because the Court was not just deciding the
eligibility of any candidate for Principal Chief, but rather was deciding the
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eligibility of the frontrunner in this election. The fact that the Cherokee people had
voted Bearpaw the leader after the primary election meant that his exclusion from
candidacy would nullify the vote of many Cherokee. The importance of this case
was exemplified by the fact that on the day the case was decided, “[m]ore than 100
Cherokees filled every seat in the tribal courtroom, … lined the walls and stood six
deep in the hallway in order to hear legal arguments.”184 Perhaps in part, it was this
high degree of interest in this decision that caused the Court to elaborate the policy
considerations underlying the remedy it granted in this case.
Above all, however, this case tested the Court’s ability to resolve
controversial issues having substantial consequences. The Court acted as an
aggressive and enduring branch of the Cherokee government. It forcefully exerted
its power to interpret internal Cherokee law, even though a leading candidate for
Principal Chief was excluded from the election process. In addition, the Court
exhibited adaptability to the changing circumstances of each case because of the
ability to move away from a rigid, interpretive analysis toward a more flexible,
explanatory analysis when the issue or the public impact created a need for further
justification for the Court’s judgment.
The most important repercussion of the Tribunal’s decision, however,
occurred the day after it rendered its opinion when Principal Chief Mankiller issued
a pardon for Bearpaw.185 Not only was the granting of a pardon by the Principal
Chief a “very rare occurrence in the modern Cherokee Nation”; it was the first of
Mankiller’s administration and “indeed the first since statehood that anyone could
remember.”186 Mankiller stated that the Tribunal “opened the door for a pardon
when they asserted in their ruling that [Bearpaw] wasn’t eligible for office without
one.”187 Bearpaw immediately filed for a rehearing based on the fact “that new
events had occurred since the court’s decision was published that altered the basis
upon which the court’s decision was reached.”188
The Tribunal addressed the new issue of the executive pardon in the
consolidated case of Mayes v. Cherokee Nation 189 . In this case, the Tribunal
returned to the language of the Constitution, specifically the provision stating that
no person who has pled guilty to a felony charge shall be eligible to hold any office
in the Cherokee Nation “unless such person has received a pardon.”190 The Court
held that this section of the Constitution “in using the word ‘pardon,’ refers to the
jurisdiction in which the felony was committed. Consequently, an appropriate
pardon in this situation should come from the State of Oklahoma. Therefore, the
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pardon issued by Wilma P. Mankiller is a nullity…”191 The Court held that its prior
decision stood.192
One dissenting opinion that challenged both the need for an Oklahoma
pardon, as well as the remedy. Justice Viles disagreed that an Oklahoma pardon
was needed, and believed that a “valid Cherokee pardon would say that ‘whatever
Mr. Bearpaw has done under another legal system, he is forgiven under the
Cherokee legal system.’”193 In addition, Justice Viles supported a new election for
Principal Chief because the “holding of the majority, which would appear to make
Joe Byrd Principal Chief means that he will be ‘elected’ without having received a
majority of the votes, as our legislation requires.”194 This dissenting Justice felt that
the “Court should not usurp the electors’ function.”195 Nevertheless, the Justice
concurred in the holding of the court by stating that pardons “operate only from
their effective date forward,” so Mankiller’s pardon did not cure Bearpaw’s
defective candidacy in this election.196 Bearpaw would have had to receive the
pardon prior to his filing for office for it to be effective.197
This particular case garnered intense attention regarding the issue of
separation of powers. Many negative remarks concerned the behavior of the
Principal Chief in issuing a pardon. According to one attorney, “Mankiller’s pardon
was a ‘blatant attempt to tear jurisdiction from the [judiciary].’”198 One candidate
for the office of Principal Chief stated that the executive branch was making
“attempts to subvert the system in order to win.”199 In addition, another candidate
for Principal Chief believed “the Cherokee Nation needs to do the right thing
because the constitution was written for a reason…and even Wilma Mankiller [the
incumbent Principal Chief] is not above the law.”200 One editorial also touched on
the issue of sovereignty in its comment that “if the Cherokee Nation is a sovereign
nation, than [sic] the ruling of its highest judicial authority should stand. And if
Wilma Mankiller is the leader of a sovereign nation, she should be willing to
uphold the law.”201 Another sentiment viewed the executive as all controlling entity
because “[t]he way it stands, there is no way for the Cherokee people to resist an
incumbent party when the chief controls everything.” [ 202] Finally, one tribal
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Mayes, 4 Okla. Trib. at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 344.
Mayes, 4 Okla. Trib. at 344.

Donna Hales, Mankiller pardons Bearpaw/Mankiller ‘is chief of all of us’, MUSKOGEE
PHOENIX, July 27, 1995.
199
Donna Hales, Last-ditch responses to Bearpaw candidacy due today, MUSKOGEE DAILY
PHOENIX AND TIMES-DEMOCRAT, July 28, 1995.
200
Adair, supra note 173.
201
Sovereignty isn’t a Matter of Convenience, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX AND TIMESDEMOCRAT, July 28, 1995.
202
Adair, supra note 173.

8/15/18 2:00 AM

25

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 3

member stated “the administration is trashing the Cherokee Constitution after
taking an oath to uphold it. If you can’t (uphold the Constitution), you need to step
aside.”203 Members of the legislative branch also criticized the executive branch for
its “refusal to accept the decision of the three tribal justices” to remove Bearpaw
from the election. [204]
In contrast, there were many who supported the redoubtable exercise of
judicial power by the Tribunal. One local newspaper reported a source as claiming
“the Cherokee people have voiced an overwhelming support for the decision made
by the justices,” and “[t]he Cherokee people are saying the decision of the justices
has restored their faith in our tribe’s judicial system.” 205 One Cherokee tribal
member thanked “the tribunal justices for their courage in standing up for the
Cherokee Constitution. I hope they continue to do so,”206 while another offered that
“these judges are to be complimented on this decision as it has restored great faith
in Cherokee Justice which has been questioned in the past.” 207 Even former
Principal Chief Swimmer was moved to express the opinion that “[Cherokees]
should all respect the final decision and be proud that our supreme court
distinguished itself through independence of thought, reasoned judgment and hard
work. Our justices, all lawyers, are not compensated, yet they take time to uphold
the constitution of the Cherokee Nation.”208
Nevertheless, the executive branch held fast to the notion of its inherent
power to extend a pardon in this situation. The executive branch disparaged the
ruling of the Court by accusing “the Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal
court of ignoring case law and robbing thousands of voters by disqualifying
Bearpaw.”209 In addition, the Principal Chief stated that “[t]hree lawyers think they
are running the tribe. They have taken away the voice of the Cherokee
people.”210 Bearpaw also harshly criticized the Tribunal in a statement that “the
Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal …disenfranchised the Cherokee
people. They postponed a ruling long enough to let deliberate confusion reign and
take the process away from the people. Regardless of what the Tribunal tries next,
they have earned their place in infamy.”211
Of all the cases decided during the 1995 election cycle, there was arguably
none more reflective of the context in which it was made than this opinion. The
attention that the executive pardon received within the Cherokee community at
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large was immense. As the public comments illustrate, there was a strong focus
upon the separation of powers between the branches of Cherokee government, as
well as the judiciary’s role in ensuring that the exercise of those powers did not
overflow into the power that belonged to another branch of government. The
political unrest within the tribe at this point in the election had reached a zenith,
and the Court was required to rule in the face of great political turmoil and public
interest in its decision. It is clear from the newspaper accounts of the pardon that
many Cherokee people felt that the pardon was an abuse of power by the executive
branch and viewed its issuance as a mere pretext for keeping the executively
endorsed candidate in the running for Principal Chief.
Yet, interestingly, the Court chose to write a simple, matter-of-fact
opinion in which two short paragraphs interpreted the constitutional provision at
issue in the case. The Court reverted back to its original practice of strictly focusing
upon the singular role of the Court as interpreter of the Cherokee Constitution.
Although this case was a case of first impression for the modern Cherokee
judiciary, the Court refrained from providing any policy reasons for its decision
and chose to the let the opinion stand on its own.
Perhaps the form of the opinion is a reflection of the effect of a firm check
that this ruling would have upon the executive branch of Cherokee government.
Although the judiciary found that the executive branch was validly exercising its
power to issue a pardon, the Court analyzed the pardon under existing internal
Cherokee law and determined the pardon to be ineffective to make Bearpaw an
eligible candidate for office under the facts of the case.

